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Diamond Nat. Res. Prot. and Conservation Ass'n vs. Diamond Valley Ranch, 138 Nev. Adv. Op.
43 (June 16, 2022)1
NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7): Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
Summary
This case addressed the scarcity of water in the Diamond Valley Hydrologic Basin
located in Eureka County, Nevada. The Basin was over-appropriated and over-pumped causing
the groundwater withdrawals from the Basin to exceed its perennial year. In 2011, Nevada
Legislature enacted NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) to address the scarcity of groundwater in
Nevada’s over-appropriated basins. NRS 534.110(7) provides that the State engineer may
designate an over-appropriated basin a Critical Management Area (VMA). After an area is
designated, NRS 534.037 allowed rights holders to petition the State Engineer to approve a
Groundwater Management Plan (GMP) that set forth the necessary steps for removal of the
basin’s designation as a CMA. Finally, to determine whether to approve the GMP, the State
Engineer is required to weigh the factors under NRS 534.037(2).
Diamond Valley was designated a CMA and its rights holder submitted a GMP to the
State Engineer for approval. The GMP deviated some from the guiding principles underlying
Nevada’s water law statutes (the doctrine of prior appropriation, which dictates that priority is
assigned based on first in time, first in right to put the water to beneficial use). The State
Engineer approved the Diamond Valley GMP.
The crux of the case was whether NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) allowed the State
Engineer to approve a GMP that deviated from the doctrine of prior appropriation. The Court
held that the Legislature unambiguously gave the State Engineer discretion to approve a GMP
that departed from the doctrine of prior appropriation and other statutes in Nevada’s statutory
water scheme.

Facts and Procedural History
The Court had previously recognized that groundwater in “Diamond Valley, Nevada is
over-appropriated and has been pumped at a rate exceeding its perennial yield for over four
decades.”2 Every year about 76,000 acre-feet of groundwater is withdrawn from the Basin’s
aquifer, yet its perennial yield is only 30,000 acre-feet. Despite the facts, 126,000 acre-feet of
water rights have been permitted in the Basin. In 2011, the Legislature enacted NRS 534.037
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and amended NRS 534.110 to allow the State Engineer to approve a Groundwater Management
Plan that would help resolve groundwater shortages in over-appropriated basins, similar to
Diamond Valley. Diamond Valley was designated a Critical Management Area in 2015. In 2018,
after a public hearing and written comments, the State Engineer approved the GMP for the
Basin. The plan called for reduced pumping from the Basin at 5-year intervals. The GMP
reduced the amount of water that rights holders can use based on the priority of holders’ rights. It
deviated from the doctrine of prior appropriation in that it required all water rights holders to
reduce their withdrawals from the Basin. Respondents who were senior rights holders in the
Basin, filed petitions for judicial review. The district court consolidated those petitions. The
Respondents sought to invalidate the GMP because it deviated from the water-law principles,
namely the doctrine of prior appropriation and from Nevada’s statutory scheme, making the plan
erroneous. The district court granted the respondents’ consolidated petitions for judicial review
and invalidated Order No. 1302. The following reasons were cited. (1) the doctrine of prior
appropriation was violated because senior appropriators were required to reduce water usage; (2)
NRS 533.035 was violated by allowing unused groundwater to be banked or transferred and (3)
two permitting statutes were violated, NRS 533.325 and NRS 533.345 by allowing appropriators
to change the point or manner of diversion without filing an application with the State Engineer.
The district court concluded that NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) do not give the State
Engineer discretion to approve a GMP that deviates from the principles and statutes previously
set forth. Order No. 1302 was invalidated. The district court did find that the State Engineer’s
analysis of the factors under NRS 534.037(2) were supported by substantial evidence.
The State Engineer and several rights holders in the Basin, appellants, appealed. They
argue that the Legislature clearly gave the State Engineer discretion to approve a GMP that
deviates from the doctrine of prior appropriation and other provisions as long as the State
Engineer considers the factors enumerated in NRS 534.037 (2) and determines that the GMP will
remove the basin’s designation as a CMA. Respondents put forth that the district court’s order
should be affirmed because the GMP reduces their water rights based on an erroneous
interpretation of the law. At oral argument, Respondents were asked if they presented any
evidence to the State Engineer evidencing the extent to which their water rights were affected by
the GMP. They did not. Nor did they ask the State Engineer to make those calculations.
Respondents were also asked if they presented any calculus to the district court showing that any
of their water rights were affected by the GMP. They responded in the negative.

Discussion
Standard of review
“The decision of the State Engineer is prima facie correct, and the burden of proof is
upon the party attacking the same.” NRS 533.450(10). The Court in its review determines

whether the State Engineer’s decision was arbitrary or capricious. The Court reviews purely legal
questions without deference to the State Engineer’s ruling.3 The Court reviews the State
Engineer’s factual finding for an abuse of discretion and will overturn those findings only if they
are not supported by substantial evidence.4
NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) plainly and unambiguously allow the State
Engineer to approve a GMP that departs from the doctrine of prior appropriation and other
statutes in Nevada’s water scheme.
Appellants argue that NRS 534.110(7) unambiguously allows the State Engineer to
approve a GMP that departs from the doctrine of prior appropriation. Respondents argue that if
the statute is ambiguous, the presumption is that the Legislature did not intend to repeal the
doctrine of prior appropriation. The Court determined that NRS 534.110 (7) permits regulation in
a manner inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation if a GMP has been approved for
the basin. The Court rejected respondents’ position that a GMP must strictly comply with the
doctrine of prior appropriation. The Court concluded that the State Engineer’s legal conclusions
were not erroneous as long as the State Engineer complied with the foregoing statutory criteria.
Further, the Court rejected the respondents’ argument that the State Engineer’s legal conclusions
in Order No. 1302 were erroneous and therefore arbitrary and capricious.
The Court acknowledges the dissenting opinions by reiterating that NRS 534.037 and
NRS 534.110 (7) are unambiguous. The dissenting opinions cite the canon of constitutional
avoidance and legislative history to interpret the statute. The Court noted that these tools cannot
be consulted when the statutory text is plain and unambiguous. 5 The Court reiterated that their
holding applies only to priority rights and does not impair vested water rights.
Further, the Court separately addressed Justice Pickering’s dissent for three reasons: (1) it
interprets NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) in a manner that would render these statutes
nugatory. The Court disagreed with Pickering noting that interpretation to be absurd. (2)
Pickering seemingly relied on unpassed legislation to interpret NRS 534.110(7). The Court
concluded that citing unpassed legislation is unpersuasive. 6 (3) The Court declined to reach
constitutional questions identified by Justice Pickering that are not essential to the decision, such
as the Takings Clause.7
As noted, the respondents conceded that they never presented evidence to the State
Engineer or the district court to show that the GMP affected their vested water rights and noted
that any Takings Clause claim “would certainly come later.”. The Court noted that they declined
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to address any constitutional issue because doing so would lead to an advisory opinion. The
Court concluded that the GMP was not arbitrary or capricious.
The factual findings for Order No. 1302 are supported by substantial evidence, and
therefore, the State Engineer did not abuse his discretion.
The Court upheld the State Engineer’s findings for Order No. 1302 if they are supported
by substantial evidence. A majority of the Basin’s permit and certificate holders petitioned the
State Engineer to approve the GMP. The State Engineer made extensive findings under NRS
534.037(2). The State Engineer concluded that the GMP would reduce withdrawals to the
Basin’s perennial yield and therefore remove the Basin from the CMA designation. The Court
rejected respondents’ argument that the State Engineer’s findings were unsupported by
substantial evidence. The Court concluded that the State Engineer’s decision to approve Order
No. 1302 is entitled to deference.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that the State Engineer’s decision to approve the GMP was not
erroneous. Additionally, the Court found that the State Engineer’s factual findings in support of
his decision were supported by substantial evidence. The district court’s decision granting
respondents’ consolidated petitions for judicial review was reversed and the State Engineer’s
decision was reinstated.
PARRAGUIREE, C.J., with whom SILVER, J., agrees, dissenting:
Justices Parraguirre and Silver dissented for two reasons. First, the justices put forth that
NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) do not “plainly and unambiguously” allow the State Engineer
to approve a Groundwater Management Plan that departs from the doctrine of prior
appropriation. Second, 1302 erroneously abdicates the beneficial use requirement and fails to
consider whether curtailment will impair vested surface water rights.8
Facts
The GMP requires senior appropriators to use less water than they are entitled to use
under the doctrine of prior appropriation. For illustrative purposes, if a senior appropriator was
entitled to 100 acre-feet of water per year, the GMP allows the appropriator to use only 67 acrefeet of water per year during the first 5 years of the plan. A junior appropriator, who is not
entitled to any water under the doctrine of prior appropriation, would be allowed to use 54 acrefeet of water per year during the first 5 years of the plan. By year 35 of the plan, the senior
appropriator would be allowed 30 acre-feet of water per year and the junior appropriator would
be allowed 24 acre-feet of water. The GMP provides for a system whereby appropriators can
buy, sell, or lease their water rights to other appropriators.9
8
9

See NRS 534.037, NRS 534.110(7), 1302.
State Engineering Order No. 1302 (Jan. 11, 2019).

DISCUSSION
Standard of review
On a petition for judicial review, “we determine whether the State Engineer’s decision
was arbitrary or capricious.”10
The doctrine of prior appropriation
The dissenting justices contend that the Legislature did not intend to abrogate longstanding law. Nevada’s water law is founded on the fundamental principle of prior appropriation.
Rather than law, the majority considered this doctrine a “guiding principle.”11 The dissenting
justices entered into a discussion and explanation of Nevada’s 155 history of prior appropriation
concluding that prior appropriation is not a mere guiding principle but is fundamental to water
law in Nevada.
NRS 534.110(7) does not allow the State Engineer to approve a GMP that departs from the
doctrine of prior appropriation
The dissenting justices argue that NRS 534.037 does not speak to the doctrine of prior
appropriation, must less authorize the State Engineer to disregard the doctrine and point to
evidence that will be discussed below.
NRS 534.110(7) is ambiguous
The dissenting justices noted that looking beyond a statute’s text is only necessary if it is
ambiguous. If so, the court must look to the legislative history and rules of statutory
interpretation to determine its meaning. NRS 534.110(7) is ambiguous because the parties’
arguments show that is it susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. The dissenting
justices advised that because NRS 534.110(7) is ambiguous, the rules of statutory interpretation
and legislative history must be consulted.
Implied repeal
“The presumption is always against the intention to repeal where express terms (of
repeal) are not used.”12 The dissenting justices agree with the respondents’ proposed
interpretation of NRS 534.110(7) because appellants’ interpretation would abrogate the prior
appropriation doctrine without an express declaration in the statutory text. The Court have
recognized that Nevada follows the prior appropriation doctrine. However, Order 1302 does not
comport with that doctrine.
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King v. St. Clair, 134 Nev. 137, 139, 414 P.3d 314. 316 (2018).
See Majority op., ante at 4.
Presson v. Presson, 38 Nev. 203, 208-09, 147 P.1081, 1082 (1915).

Legislative history
Legislative history supports the conclusion that NRS 534.110(7) was not intended to
allow the State Engineer to adopt a GMP inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation.13
The justices noted a bill sponsored by Assemblyperson Pete Goicoechea (2011) in which he
discussed how GMPs would treat priority rights. Goicoechea stated, “Water rights in Nevada are
first in time, first in right. The older the water right, the higher the priority.”14 The legislative
history makes clear that junior – not senior appropriators have the burden of reducing water
usage under a GMP.
Constitutional avoidance
The dissenting justices concluded that the respondents’ proposed interpretation of NRS
534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) should be adopted because it avoids constitutional doubts under
the Takings Clause. Noting that Nevada’s water law gives senior appropriators at least three
sticks in the bundle of property rights: the right to transfer, the right of use and enjoyment, and
the right to exclude. Property rights, therefore, are subject to the Takings Clause.15
The dissenting justices noted three United States Supreme Court cases and asserted that
requiring senior appropriators to pump less groundwater before junior appropriators are forced to
cease pumping that same groundwater could be a compensable physical taking under the Fifth
Amendment.16 The justices concluded that an interpretation of NRS 534.037 and NRS
534.110(7) that allows the State Engineer to depart from priority regulation and possibly
reallocate senior water rights – without compensation following an eminent domain proceeding –
could be an unconstitutional physical taking under the Nevada and United States Constitutions.
The respondents’ interpretation should prevail.
Conclusion
NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) are intended to allow all rights holders in an overappropriated basin to create a collaborative GMP to reduce withdrawals from the basin, with the
junior appropriators being asked to reduce water use. If the GMP is approved, the State Engineer
need not order curtailment by priority. If the rights holders do not approve the GMP then the
State Engineer must order curtailment by priority.
Order 1302 departs from other laws
Order 1302 violates the beneficial use statute and does not account for vested surface
water rights.
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See NEV. REV. STAT. 534.037.
Hearing on A.B. 419 Before the Senate Gov’t Affairs Comm., 76 th Leg., at 13 (Nev., May 23, 2011).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 755
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The GMP does not comply with the beneficial use statute
The GMP uses a market-based approach. Unused allocations of water may be banked,
traded, leased or sold. Unused allocations can be carried over and banked for use in a subsequent
year. The cornerstone of allocation is “the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to use of
water.” For every application to appropriate water, a “fundamental requirement is that water only
be appropriated for beneficial use.” The GMP departs from Nevada’s beneficial use statute
because it allows unused water to be banked, sold, traded, or leased rather than allocating water
based on beneficial use. The dissenting justices noted that there appears to be no binding or
persuasive authority that classifies water banking as a beneficial use in a prior appropriation
jurisdiction. Because the GMP contravenes laws delineating beneficial use, it is contrary to
established law. The justices held that the State Engineer’s decision to approve Order 1302 was
capricious.
The GMP does not account for vested surface water rights
The Diamond Valley GMP does not account for its effect on vested surface water rights.
Because statutory law may not impair vested rights, a GMP approved under NRS 534.037 must
account for its effect on vested surface water rights under 534.037(2)(g). Accordingly, the State
Engineer’s contrary conclusion was capricious because established law requires the preservation
of vested rights.
CONCLUSION
The dissenting justices do not believe that the groundwater shortages that impact
Diamond Valley and Nevada allow the Court to interpret NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.119(7)
contrary to Nevada’s historical water law. The constitution controls over any legislative act, and
therefore, the Court should adopt an interpretation of NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) that
avoids constitutional violence. Justice Parraguirre would affirm the district court’s decision to
grant respondents’ petition for judicial review because it is his belief that Order 1302 is
capricious.

PICKERING, J., with whom SILVER, J., agrees, dissenting:
Justice Pickering argued that the GMP does not compensate or provide a mechanism for
compensating the senior water right holders. The GMP presumes but does not require beneficial
use of the water rights it counts. These features place the GMP in direct conflict with two
fundamental principles underlying Nevada’s water law statutes: the prior appropriation doctrine
and beneficial use doctrine.17 Pickering argues that the majority opines that on a “plain text”
reading. NRS 534.110(7) and NRS 534.037 “plainly and unambiguously allow the State
Engineer to approve a GMP that departs from the doctrine of prior appropriation and other
statutes in Nevada’s water scheme.” She continued that nothing in the text of either statute
expressly exempts GMP’s from the prior appropriation and beneficial use doctrines.
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Justice Pickering wrote separate from Chief Justice Parraguirre because of another basic
problem with the majority’s approach.18 She argued that a court does not determine a statute’s
meaning by reading its words out of context, in isolation from the body of statutes it inhabits.19
The two statutes relied on by the majority are part of the prior appropriation and beneficial use
chapters. Unless Legislature expressly exempts GMPs from these doctrines, all GMPs (including
Diamond) will remain subject to them.
Justice Pickering argued that the majority compounded its error by looking at NRS
534.037 and the fourth sentence in NRS 534.110(7) and deciding their meaning without
considering their text in the larger context of NRS 534.110 and NRS Chapters 533 and 534.20
She believed that allowing the State Engineer to approve a GMP that deviates from the prior
appropriation and beneficial use doctrines puts NRS 534.037 and NRS 534.110(7) into direct
conflict with the rest of NRS Chapters 533 and 534.
Conclusion
Justice Pickering concluded her dissent by explaining that text, context, and the enforcing
agency’s original interpretation all militate against the reading that the majority gave NRS
534.110(7) and NRS 534.037.
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